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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Kevin Rodriquez was elected to serve in the Virgin 
Islands Legislature.  After his election, Janelle K. Sarauw and 
Brigitte Berry filed a lawsuit in the Virgin Islands Superior 
Court against Rodriquez, the Virgin Islands Joint Board of 
Elections, the Board of Elections of St. Thomas and St. John, 
and Caroline F. Fawkes (the “Board of Elections 
Defendants”) challenging Rodriquez’s qualifications to serve 
as a member of the Legislature (the “Removed Action”).  
Rodriquez removed that suit to federal court and filed his own 
action against the 32nd Legislature of the Virgin Islands and 
its president, Myron Jackson, essentially asking the District 
Court to rule that only the Legislature can decide who is 
qualified to serve in the Legislature (the “Federal Action”).  
Because a judicial determination about whether Rodriquez is 
qualified to serve as a member of the Virgin Islands 32nd 
Legislature would infringe on the separation of powers 
between the Virgin Islands legislative and judicial branches, 
the Federal Action is no longer justiciable.  As to the 
Removed Action, Rodriquez does not having standing to 
appeal the District Court’s order because he was a prevailing 
party, and we have no meaningful relief to grant him.  We 
will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the 
Federal Action and dismiss Rodriquez’s appeal of the 
Removed Action. 
 
 
 
 
I 
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 On November 8, 2016, the Virgin Islands held an 
election to choose the seven senators to represent the District 
of St. Thomas-St. John in the Virgin Islands’ 32nd 
Legislature.  The seats were to be filled by the top seven vote-
getters.  Among the eighteen candidates running for the seats 
were Rodriquez, who placed sixth and won a seat in the 
Legislature, and Sarauw, who placed eighth and did not win a 
seat.  The Board of Elections certified the election results on 
November 22, 2016. 
 
 After the election, Sarauw learned that on January 25, 
2016, Rodriquez filed a bankruptcy petition in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee 
in which he swore under penalty of perjury that he lived in 
Tennessee and had not lived in another state anytime during 
the preceding three years.  As a result, on December 9, 2016, 
Sarauw and Berry, a volunteer for Sarauw’s campaign, filed 
the Removed Action in the Superior Court of the Virgin 
Islands, alleging that Rodriquez was not qualified to serve in 
the Virgin Islands Legislature because he had not been a bona 
fide resident of the Virgin Islands for at least three years 
preceding the date of his election, as required by § 6(b) of the 
Revised Organic Act (“ROA”), 48 U.S.C. § 1572(b).  The 
complaint sought, among other things, (1) a declaration that 
Rodriquez does not meet the residency eligibility requirement 
for Virgin Islands Legislators set forth in the ROA, and 
(2) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief compelling 
the Board of Elections to de-certify Rodriquez as a qualified 
candidate and preventing him from taking a seat in the 32nd 
Legislature.   
 
 On December 29, 2016, the Superior Court issued a 
preliminary injunction enjoining Rodriquez from taking the 
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oath of office and held that “[p]laintiffs [had] a reasonable 
probability of showing that Rodriquez is not a bona fide 
resident of the Virgin Islands for the three years preceding the 
November 2016 election.”  App. 457.  On January 4, 2017, 
the Virgin Islands Supreme Court denied Rodriquez’s petition 
to appeal the Superior Court’s order.1  
 
 On the same day the Supreme Court ruled, the 
Superior Court held a merits hearing on Sarauw and Berry’s 
request for a permanent injunction, found that the Virgin 
Islands was Rodriquez’s domicile, vacated the preliminary 
injunction, and dismissed the case.  Sarauw and Berry 
appealed the Superior Court’s decision to the Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court. 
 
 On January 8, 2017, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 
vacated the Superior Court’s order and held that Rodriquez 
was “bound to his prior representations” to the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee under the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel, and thus “cannot claim in this proceeding 
to have been a bona fide resident of the Virgin Islands.”  App. 
540.  The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Superior 
Court to consider whether the trial court’s jurisdiction to grant 
further relief evaporates upon the establishment of the 32nd 
Session of the Legislature because, under § 6(g) of the ROA, 
48 U.S.C. § 1572(g), the Legislature is “the sole judge of the 
elections and qualifications of its members.”  To allow the 
Superior Court to decide this issue, the Supreme Court issued 
the following Order: “Kevin A. Rodriquez is ENJOINED 
                                              
1 In an opinion filed on the same day, the Virgin 
Islands Supreme Court characterized its ruling as an 
affirmance of the Superior Court’s order. 
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from taking the oath of office for the 32nd Legislature, 
pending further order of this Court, so that the Superior Court 
may conduct the appropriate proceedings on remand.”  App. 
543.  On the morning of January 9—shortly before the 
Legislature’s swearing-in ceremony—the Superior Court 
issued its own order enjoining Rodriquez from taking the oath 
of office.  On the same day, the swearing-in ceremony was 
held for new senators, and the 32nd Legislature was 
convened.  Rodriquez was not sworn in and has not taken a 
seat in the Legislature. 
 
 On January 10, 2017, Rodriquez removed Sarauw’s 
lawsuit to the District Court of the Virgin Islands pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1441 and filed the Federal Action.  In the Federal 
Action, Rodriquez essentially sought (1) a declaration that the 
Virgin Islands Legislature has sole authority to determine its 
members; (2) an order dissolving the Superior Court’s 
preliminary injunction, as it violates the separation of powers; 
and (3) an injunction directing the 32nd Legislature to seat 
Rodriquez as a member.  Thereafter, numerous motions were 
filed.  Sarauw and Berry filed a motion to remand the 
Removed Action and to expedite proceedings, Rodriquez 
filed a motion for summary judgment and to expedite 
proceedings, and the 32nd Legislature and Jackson filed a 
motion to dismiss the Federal Action. 
 
 The District Court denied the motion to remand the 
Removed Action but thereafter dismissed it as moot.  The 
Court held that: (1) Sarauw and Berry’s request for a 
permanent injunction compelling Fawkes and the Board of 
Elections to decertify Rodriquez as a qualified candidate was 
moot because the election results had already been certified; 
and (2) Sarauw’s request for a declaration that Rodriquez 
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does not meet the three-year residency requirement and is 
legally ineligible for membership in the 32nd Legislature was 
a moot “post-election challenge of the qualifications of a 
candidate for the Virgin Islands Legislature.”2  App. 56. 
 
The District Court also dismissed the Federal Action 
and ruled that: (1) Rodriquez was not entitled to an injunction 
directing the 32nd Legislature to seat him because an oath is a 
qualification for membership in the Virgin Islands Legislature 
and Rodriquez has not taken an oath and hence is not a 
“member” of the 32nd Legislature; (2) even if Rodriquez 
were a member of the 32nd Legislature, it would refrain from 
using its equitable powers “to command a coordinate, coequal 
branch of government to undertake a task—seating 
Rodriquez—that is entirely and exclusively within the 32nd 
Legislature’s control,” App. 43; and (3) Rodriquez was not 
entitled to a declaration concerning the validity of § 6(g) of 
the ROA—which states that the “legislature shall be the sole 
judge of the elections and qualifications of its members,” 48 
U.S.C. § 1572(g)—because it is inappropriate for a court to 
pronounce the validity of a statute where, as in this case, the 
statute’s validity is not at issue. 
 
                                              
 2 The District Court also denied Sarauw’s request for 
an injunction barring Rodriquez from serving as a Senator 
under 5 V.I.C. § 80 because that statute entitles taxpayers to 
sue the government of the Virgin Islands or one of its officers 
or employees to prevent a violation of the law and is 
inapplicable to Rodriquez because he is not an officer or 
employee of the Government of the Virgin Islands.  This 
ruling was not appealed.  
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On the evening of February 7, 2017, after the District 
Court issued its opinion, the Governor of the Virgin Islands 
issued a proclamation calling for a special election to fill the 
vacancy in the 32nd Legislature of the Virgin Islands.  We 
denied Rodriquez’s motions to stay the election and to enjoin 
the Board of Elections from certifying the results.  The 
Special Election was held on April 8, 2017, and the 
uncertified results reveal that Sarauw was the winner. 
 
Rodriquez appealed the District Court’s orders, and we 
granted the motion to consider his appeal on an expedited 
basis.   
 
II 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over both matters 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the cases involve the 
application of the ROA, which is a federal statute Congress 
passed to provide a charter for the Virgin Islands government.  
Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 135 (3d Cir. 2009); Brow v. 
Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1032 (3d Cir. 1993).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3  Because the District 
                                              
3 Section 6(g) does not deprive a court of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Rather, § 6(g) raises issues of 
justiciability based on separation of powers concerns similar 
to those under the political question doctrine.  Brown v. 
Hansen, 973 F.2d 1118, 1121-22 (3d Cir. 1992) (considering 
the court’s jurisdiction to review the Legislature’s actions 
under § 6(g) and stating that justiciability doctrines such as 
the political question doctrine do not deprive a court of 
subject matter jurisdiction but rather “preclude[] courts from 
granting relief that would violate the separation of powers”); 
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Court dismissed the actions based on justiciability doctrines, 
our review is plenary.  United States v. Gov’t of V.I., 363 
F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2004); Brown v. Hansen, 973 F.2d 
1118, 1121 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
III 
 
A 
 
1 
 
 This case centers on the question of who should 
determine Rodriquez’s qualifications to serve in the 32nd 
Legislature of the Virgin Islands.4  Specifically at issue here 
                                                                                                     
Mapp v. Lawaetz, 882 F.2d 49, 54 n.5 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting 
that § 6(g) raises justiciability issues and proceeding to rule, 
demonstrating that § 6(g) does not strip a court of 
jurisdiction); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 
512 (1969) (stating that the separation of powers doctrine 
does not divest a court of jurisdiction).  Once the Court 
satisfies itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction, it then 
considers whether the case is justiciable.  See Brown, 973 
F.2d at 1121.  Only after it is satisfied that it has both subject 
matter jurisdiction and that the case presents a justiciable case 
or controversy under Article III of the U.S. Constitution may 
it turn to adjudicating the merits.  Larsen v. Senate of 
Commonwealth of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(stating that resolving justiciability issues must precede a 
decision on the merits). 
4 On appeal, Rodriquez does not argue that he met the 
residency requirement or challenge the conclusion that he did 
not meet it. 
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is who should decide whether Rodriquez satisfied the 
qualification that he has been a “bona fide resident of the 
Virgin Islands for at least three years . . . preceding the date 
of his election.”  48 U.S.C. § 1572(b). 
 
To answer this question we must turn to the ROA—a 
federal law that operates as the territorial Constitution of the 
United States Virgin Islands, Kendall, 572 F.3d at 135.  The 
ROA empowers two bodies—the Board of Elections and the 
Legislature—to evaluate the qualifications of the 
Legislature’s candidates and members.  See 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1572(c), (g). 
 
The ROA provides that the Board of Elections is 
“charged with the duty of directing the administration of the 
electoral system of the Virgin Islands.”  Id. § 1572(c).  At the 
outset of the election process, the Board of Elections, a 
popularly elected and independent entity, is empowered to 
determine a candidate’s qualifications.  18 V.I.C. § 411 
(stating that the Board is authorized to “determine[] that a 
candidate for election or nomination does not meet the 
qualifications established by law for the office,” and 
“disqualify such candidate[s]” from an election); Bryan v. 
Fawkes, 61 V.I. 201, 213-14 (2014) (stating that “the power 
to determine whether a candidate meets the minimum 
qualifications for office so as to appear on a general election 
ballot is clearly not exclusive to the legislature”).  Once the 
election occurs, the Board of Elections has the power to 
certify the results.  18 V.I.C.  
§ 4(b)(4).  Between the certification of the election and the 
time the Legislature convenes, a court may review election 
challenges that may change the results of the election, which 
may occur, for example, if there has been a fraud.  Bryan v. 
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Todman, 28 V.I. 42, 45 (V.I. Terr. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 1993 WL 
13141075 (D.V.I. Oct. 29, 1993); see also Bryan, 61 V.I. at 
215, 217, 218 & n.5 (discussing the court’s role in reviewing 
election matters).  After the Legislature convenes, however, 
the power to determine a winning candidate’s eligibility to 
serve shifts to the Legislature.  48 U.S.C. § 1572(g) (stating 
that “[t]he legislature shall be the sole judge of the elections 
and qualifications of its members”); Bryan, 61 V.I. at 217.   
 
2 
 
The question before us is whether, once the Legislature 
convenes, a court has the power to decide whether an 
individual satisfies the qualifications to hold a seat in the 
Legislature.  A court’s power to review such matters is 
influenced by its obligation to respect the separation of 
powers among the branches of government.  This is the 
foundation of the political question doctrine, which dictates 
that courts will not adjudicate political questions reserved for 
the executive or legislative branches.  Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969) (“It is well established that the 
federal courts will not adjudicate political questions.”); 
Brown, 973 F.2d at 1121-22 (applying the political question 
doctrine to questions reserved for the Legislature of the 
Virgin Islands).  While the political question doctrine 
generally applies only to the federal courts’ review of 
questions reserved for the federal political branches and does 
not prevent the federal courts’ review of cases regarding state 
or territorial political branches, Larsen, 152 F.3d at 246, the 
ROA divides the Virgin Islands government into legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches and thereby “implicitly 
incorporate[s] the principle of separation of powers into the 
law of the territory,” Kendall, 572 F.3d at 135 (quoting Smith 
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v. Magras, 124 F.3d 457, 465 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Because the 
ROA incorporates the principles of the separation of powers 
that animate the political question doctrine, we have applied 
the analysis embodied in the political question doctrine to 
requests to review actions of the Virgin Islands Legislature.  
See Brown, 973 F.2d at 1121-22; see also Mapp, 882 F.2d at 
55 (stating that a court “should be wary” of interfering with 
the Virgin Islands Legislature’s conduct of its own affairs); 
cf. Larsen, 152 F.3d at 246 (noting that the political question 
doctrine technically does not apply to questions regarding the 
Pennsylvania Legislature but proceeding to apply political 
question analysis to determine whether a court can review 
that legislature’s impeachment of a state Supreme Court 
justice).  Thus, while this matter does not raise a per se 
political question, political question case law nonetheless 
informs our analysis. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a 
nonjusticiable political question exists where there is “a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [an] 
issue to a coordinate political department.”  Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Brown, 973 F.2d at 1121-
22 (applying Baker to determine whether an issue is a 
political question reserved for the Virgin Islands Legislature).  
As discussed above, the ROA, as the Virgin Islands 
Constitution, and specifically § 6(g), contain a “textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment” of power to the 
Legislature to determine the qualifications of its members.  
This prevents courts from interfering with the Virgin Islands 
Legislature’s determination of the qualifications of its 
members, including whether they meet the residency 
requirement of § 6(b).  See Mapp, 882 F.2d at 54 (“[U]nder 
the [ROA], the legislature is the ‘sole judge’ of whether [a 
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member] met [the Act’s] eligibility requirements.”); see also 
Brown, 973 F.2d at 1124 (“Although courts may determine a 
legislature’s compliance with external laws, here the external 
law itself, § 6(g) of the [ROA], commits the relevant issue to 
the discretion of the legislature.”).  Thus, under the plain 
language of § 6(g), once the 32nd Legislature convened, it 
alone had the authority to determine whether Rodriquez 
possessed the qualifications to be a member and was thereby 
entitled to take the oath and be seated.5 
 
In sum, before the 32nd Legislature convened, the 
Board of Elections had the authority to review the 
qualifications of prospective members of the Legislature, and 
because it is not a part of the Legislature or any other branch 
of the Virgin Islands government, issues of separation of 
powers do not preclude a court from reviewing the Board of 
                                              
 5 This is not to say that § 6(g) immunizes all of the 
Legislature’s exclusion or expulsion decisions from judicial 
review, but a high bar must be met for a court to opine on 
such issues.  See, e.g., Larsen, 152 F.3d at 248 (stating that 
the impeachment of a state judge is reserved for the state 
legislature but that due process challenges to the 
impeachment process may be justiciable under certain 
circumstances); Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 451 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (concluding that, under the political question 
doctrine, the court may not decide the qualifications of 
members of Congress but not precluding judicial review of 
“all judicial challenges bearing any relationship to legislative 
resolution of disputed elections,” such as where there is “a 
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the 
power as will constitute a denial of due process of law” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Elections’ decisions concerning a candidate’s qualifications.  
18 V.I.C. § 412; Bryan, 61 V.I. at 213-14, 216; see also 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (noting that the “nonjusticiability of a 
political question is primarily a function of the separation of 
powers”); Kendall, 572 F.3d at 135-36 (stating that the 
“separation of powers principle prohibits any branch of 
government from exercising powers that are reserved for the 
other branches, unless such an exercise is expressly provided 
or incidental to the powers that a branch necessarily has” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).6  But now that the 32nd 
Legislature has convened, only that body can determine the 
qualifications of its members and separation of powers 
principles require a court to decline weighing in on these 
issues.  See 48 U.S.C.  
§ 1572(g); Bryan, 61 V.I. at 216; see also Mapp, 882 F.2d at 
54.  We will therefore affirm the order dismissing the Federal 
Action.  Only the 32nd Legislature may judge whether 
Rodriquez satisfies the requirements set forth in § 6(b), 
including the residency requirement, and is thereby qualified 
to serve as one of its members and whether to administer the 
oath and seat Rodriquez. 
 
B 
 
                                              
6 The Virgin Islands Legislature is “not a continuing 
body” and is instead re-constituted with every election.  See 
Bryan, 61 V.I. at 212-13.  Thus, the 31st Legislature is 
distinct from the 32nd Legislature, so the 31st Legislature 
could not determine the qualifications of members of the 
32nd Legislature, and the 32nd Legislature could not 
determine the qualifications of its members before that body 
convened.  See id. at 213.  
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 We will dismiss Rodriquez’s appeal of the District 
Court’s dismissal of the Removed Action.  Under Article III 
of the Constitution, a federal court may “exercise . . . judicial 
power,” Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 
912, 914 (3d Cir. 1987)), over “only actual, ongoing cases or 
controversies,” Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl. L.P. 
v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001).  The case-or-
controversy requirement extends to all phases of federal 
judicial proceedings (including appellate review).  As one of 
the prevailing parties, Rodriquez does not have standing to 
appeal the dismissal of a case filed against him because we 
have no further meaningful relief to grant him.  Cf. Reschini 
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Ind., 46 F.3d 246, 249 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  To the extent he is seeking the dissolution of the 
preliminary injunction enjoining him from taking the oath of 
office, that injunction was dissolved automatically when the 
District Court dismissed the Removed Action.  After all, “[a] 
preliminary injunction cannot survive the dismissal of a 
complaint.”  Venezia v. Robinson, 16 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 
1994); see also 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2947 (3d ed. 2013).  
Accordingly, because we can no longer grant effective relief 
concerning the parties in the Removed Action, we will 
dismiss Rodriquez’s appeal of the Removed Action for lack 
of standing. 
 
IV 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Rodriquez’s 
appeal of the Removed Action, and we will affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing the Federal Action because it 
presents a request for court intervention where only the 
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Legislature can act.  With this ruling, the 32nd Legislature 
should fulfill its statutory obligation to judge Rodriquez’s 
qualifications for membership in the Legislature. 
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